A bstract: Management ownership has ethical consequences because it has an interest alignment effect or an entrenchment effect. In this paper we investigate the ethical consequences of management ownership in China using accounting conservatism as the direct measure of entrenchment and alignment between shareholders and managers. We argue and find that the ethical effect of management ownership differs significantly in firms with different ultimate controlling shareholders. Specifically, management ownership in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) has an alignment effect while management ownership has less of an alignment effect in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than in NSOEs. T hese results show that the ethical consequences of management ownership is moderated by the nature of ultimate controlling ownership.
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Introduction
Management ownership has ethical consequences. It has long been recognized that increasing management ownership helps align the interests of shareholders and managers and mitigate agency problems between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; emsetz, 1983) . It is also possible that managers with high ownership stakes are less likely to be disciplined and, as a result, are more likely to engage in self-interested actions (Holderness and Sheehan, 1991) . One way to examine the ethical consequences of management ownership is to investigate its effect on firm performance or firm value. The extant literature documents that management ownership plays a corporate governance role and thus is an important determinant of corporate performance (Morck et al., 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Holderness et al., 1999) . Some studies find that management ownership has a positive effect on firm performance and this is interpreted as evidence of the alignment effect (Mehran, 1995; Holthausen and L arcker, 1996; Core and L arcker, 2002) . Other studies find that it has a negative impact on firm performance and this is considered to be evidence of an entrenchment effect (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Lasfer, 2006) . However, as there are many determinants of corporate performance, it is difficult to establish a direct causal relation between management ownership and corporate performance. A t the same time, prior studies usually neglect the effect of ultimate ownership on the role of managerial ownership. Since different ultimate owners have different objectives, managerial appointment mechanisms and monitoring powers and wills, management ownership should play different roles.
This paper aims to examine the ethical consequences of management ownership measured by accounting conservatism while taking into account the ownership structure. Compared with corporate performance, accounting conservatism is a more direct measure of interest conflicts and alignment between shareholders and managers (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Goh and L i, 2011) . A ccounting conservatism helps avoid the firm' s managers receiving large bonuses by providing biased upward estimates of future cash flows, which creates deadweight losses and reduces firm value. It thus helps reduce the likelihood that managers will overstate net assets and cumulative earnings to transfer wealth to themselves rather than managing the firm in an optimal manner (Watts, 2003) . A s a consequence, it can facilitate efficient contracting between managers and shareholders in the presence of agency problems and help reduce agency costs (Watts, 2003; A hmed and uellman, 2007; L aFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Shuto and Takada, 2010) .
The co-existence of SOEs and NSOEs makes China an excellent setting for us to examine the ethical consequences of management ownership. A s will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2., controlling shareholders in NSOEs aim to maximize profit while those in SOEs have social, political as well as economic objectives which often are conflicting. Furthermore, management ownership stakes in NSOEs are usually held for a long period, while SOE managers are appointed by the government, and their tenure is often shorter than that of their NSOE counterparts. A dditionally, NSOEs are subject to stringent monitoring by their shareholders, while SOEs face weaker monitoring than do NSOEs. These differences between SOEs and NSOEs are expected to affect the role of management ownership.
We find that an increase in management ownership reduces the level of accounting conservatism in NSOEs, thus indicating that management ownership has an interest alignment effect. In contrast, among SOEs, the impact of management ownership on accounting conservatism is weaker than that in NSOEs and the relation between management ownership and accounting conservatism is insignificant.This finding shows that management ownership has less of an alignment effect in SOEs than in NSOEs.
Our study makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, the paper to our knowledge is the first to use a direct measure to examine the role of management ownership and thus it helps improve the reliability of the research findings in this literature. Second, this paper is also the first to study the role of management ownership from the perspective of ownership structure and finds that management ownership has different roles in different types of firms (SOEs and NSOEs). This helps enrich the literature on the role of managerial ownership. Finally, while existing studies on the role of management ownership are mainly situated in developed economies, the findings of this study are important for understanding the role of management ownership in developing and emerging economies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates our hypothesis and is followed by an overview of our research design in Section 3. Our sample and data are described in Section 4, and Section 5 tests our hypothesis and analyzes the results. Section 6 provides further robustness checks. T he final section concludes the paper.
Hypothesis development

Management ownership and agency problem
Traditional agency theory suggests that greater management ownership generates a greater alignment of interests between shareholders and managers (J ensen and Meckling, 1976) . This interest alignment effect argument predicts that managers with larger ownership stakes will have stronger incentives to act in line with outside shareholders' interests. This is because managers with high ownership stakes are likely to have longer horizons and more human capital tied to the firm. Thus, under the interest alignment effect, managers have greater incentives to enhance the value of the firm' s shares as management ownership increases. In support of the argument that higher managerial equity ownership better aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, Mehran (1995) finds that firm performance, as proxied by Tobin's Q and return on assets, is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers. Holthausen and Larcker (1996) and Core and Larcker (2002) also document increases in both management ownership and firm performance.
Management ownership may also have an entrenchment effect, such that managers with greater control of the firm have more scope to behave opportunistically (Morck et al., 1988) . The more shares a manager holds, the less power the other owners of the company have to influence the manager' s decisions. This allows managers to make specific investments that complement their own skills and strengthen their bargaining power, making it difficult to replace them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . When the proportion of management ownership increases, managers have more voting rights and greater influence enabling them to pursue their own interests. Moreover, the larger the proportion, the less likely the company will be taken over, and thus the lower the pressure exerted by market control on managers.
However， most studies in this line examine different ownership levels and produce inconsistent results. McConnell and Servaes (1990) examine a large data set and find evidence consistent with the management entrenchment argument only when inside ownership exceeds 40% of the firm. L asfer (2006) also finds that high management ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. Other studies using small samples such as those of Morck et al. (1988) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) show that low levels of management ownership appear to be associated with managerial entrenchment. Crucially, recent studies find no evidence that management ownership is associated with greater entrenchment after controlling for the endogeneity between management ownership and the investment opportunity set (L aFond and Roychowdhury, 2008 The interest alignment effect operates in Chinese NSOEs because management ownership in NSOEs is more likely to produce the interest alignment effect which reduces agency costs. The most important reason for this intuition is that both shareholders and managers care about economic outcomes, the prerequisite for the existence of aligned economic interests. A s management ownership increases, the economic interests of shareholders and managers in NSOEs tend to become more closely aligned. A nother factor to consider in this context is that NSOEs in China are subject to stringent monitoring by their shareholders, which should reduce the entrenchment effect that increasing management ownership could bring about. A s the equity 2
The data were manually collected from http://www.cninfo.com.cn/, the information disclosure website authorized by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Market monitoring checks the tendency for increasing management ownership to lead to greater managerial expropriation.
In sum, the common concern for economic objectives among shareholders and managers of NSOEs and the long-term nature of management stakes reinforce the interest alignment effect of managerial ownership. In addition, monitoring by the controlling shareholders of NSOEs and the managerial labor market limits the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership. To the extent that these forces combine to produce a net interest alignment effect of management ownership, we expect management ownership to have a substitutive effect on accounting conservatism in NSOEs.
The presence of controlling state ownership changes the relative magnitude of the interest alignment and entrenchment effects of management ownership for several reasons. First, SOEs' multiple goals reduce the likelihood of management ownership aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. uring the transition to a market-based economy, maintaining employment levels and providing social security to the unemployed are important to maintaining social stability. ue to the lack of independent social security institutions and the fact that firms with strong profit incentives are not interested in promoting social stability, SOEs in China are required to continue to play a role in providing social welfare. Because most SOE managers are current or former government bureaucrats, decisions concerning their promotion and compensation depend more on adherence to SOEs' various political and social objectives than on the firm' s operating and financial performance (Fan et al., 2007) .
These political and social objectives usually conflict with the firm' s economic performance. However, this does not deter SOEs from granting shares to their managers; for example, managers could obtain stock options by meeting a very low performance threshold which reduces their incentive role and turns them into a form of managerial welfare (L u et al., 2009 ). This means that increasing management ownership is less likely to produce the interest alignment effect in SOEs than in NSOEs.
In addition, the interest alignment effect of management ownership usually requires that equity stakes are held over a long horizon. However, the period of management ownership in SOEs is usually short. The main reason for this is that most 1 0 managers are appointed for a short period and their human capital and reputation are thus less associated with the firms they serve. SOE managers are often bureaucrats and are ultimately appointed by the government, meaning that they frequently change jobs between government and SOEs or among SOEs in accordance with government assignments. Indeed, their average tenure is only 2.88 years (L iu and L iu, 2007) . A s a result, they do not have strong incentives to hold long term stock positions in the firms they serve. Furthermore, their job shifts among companies and between government and SOEs allow them to dispose of their stock holdings, because although the Company Law stipulates that they cannot transfer more than 25% of their shares during their term of office, they can dispose of all their shares six months after leaving their job. In other words, while SOE managers must keep most of their shares for a short period, they do not have incentives to hold shares for long. The result is that management ownership does not have the desired interest alignment effect.
Third, the monitoring of SOEs is often weak because it is more difficult to monitor their managers than it is to oversee their private sector counterparts. ue to the difficulties in distinguishing between policy-induced losses and non-policy-induced losses, managers of SOEs can ascribe all their losses to state policies (L in et al., 1998) In sum, the nature of ultimate controlling ownership could decrease the alignment effect of management ownership and increase the entrenchment effect of management ownership. Combined these two effects together, we have the following hypothesis:
Management ownership has less of an alignment effect (or a greater entrenchment effect) in SOE s than in NSOE s.
R esearch design
We use accounting conservatism as the direct measure of the interest conflict and alignment between management and shareholders. We measure accounting conservatism using Basu's (1997) earnings-return model as follows:
where:
NIi,t= annual income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1;
RETi,t= market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns of firm i from May of year t to A pril of year t1;
NEGi,t= indicator variable equal to 1 if RETi,tis negative, and 0 otherwise.
In Equation (1) We expand Equation (1) into the following model to test the above hypothesis: size, leverage and the market-to-book ratio. We measure firm size (Size) by the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets, firm leverage (Lev) by the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets, and the market-to-book ratio (MB)
by the market value of the firm's assets over the book value of its assets. eliminated. 4 The selection process yields 10,944 firm-year observations. Panel A of The number of SOEs in our sample increases slightly (from 819 to 873) over the period, while the number of NSOEs increases considerably (from 187 to 568). This is consistent with the pattern of the IPO market in China, where NSOEs went public in recent years. Panel B of Table 1 details the distribution of all sample firms across various industries. The industry composition of our sample is similar to that of the population of firms in the CSMA R database. The most heavily represented industry is manufacturing (57.37% of the whole sample).
Insert Table 1 Here We also winsorize observations in the top and bottom 1% of annual income (NI) and return (RET) observations as a robustness check; the results are the same.
(4.51%) and median (0.004%) ownership shares held by their NSOE counterparts.
The mean (median) NI in our sample is 1.7% (1.8%) for SOEs and 1.2% (1.7%) for NSOEs. 5 Note that the left skew of the NSOE NI distribution is consistent with accounting conservatism. Panel  of Table 2 reports differences between SOEs and
NSOEs. Relative to NSOEs, SOEs are larger (SIZE) and more profitable (NI), but have lower management ownership (OWN), lower investment opportunity (MB) and lower leverage (LEV).
Insert Table 2 Here Table 3 This indicates that reported earnings reflect at least a portion of the information reflected in returns, consistent with findings in prior studies (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008) .
Insert Table 3 Here
E mpirical results
We estimate Equation (2) using pooled OLS regressions to test our hypothesis. We follow LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) by using scaled decile ranks for all variables except NI, RET and NEG. To compute the scaled decile ranks, we first rank observations by year into 10 groups from 0 to 9, then divide each group value by 9 so the rank variable ranges from 0 to 1. Insert Table 4 Here In Model (3) of Table 4 , we add the control variables MB, LEV and SIZE to control for their potential effects on accounting conservatism. We also add interaction terms between these control variables and NEG, RET. T he regression results are unchanged.
Furthermore, we divide the sample into two sub-samples -one for SOEs and the other for NSOEs -and run regressions for them separately. The results for SOEs and NSOEs are reported as Models (4) and (5), respectively. The 11 b values in the two models reveal that although the association between management ownership and accounting conservatism is significantly negative in NSOEs, it is insignificant in SOEs. These results are consistent with those of Models (2) and (3) and provide further support for our hypothesis.
R obustness checks
We have used Basu' s (1997) earnings-return model to measure conservatism in the above analysis. Here, we test the robustness of our results to another commonly used measure of conditional conservatism that does not rely on share returns: the earnings-change model (Basu, 1997; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005 
Δ NI = change in annual income before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1;
NEG= an indicator variable equal to 1 if Δ NI is negative, and 0 otherwise; Specifically, similar to Equation (2), we extend the basic earnings-change model as follows: 
Where SOE, OWN and the control variables are defined in the same manner as in 6 Other studies that use this model include those of Nichols et al. (2008) , Chung and Wynn (2008) , and Goh and L i (2011).
Equation (2).
Basu (1997) shows that conservatism results in lower earnings persistence in bad news periods than it does in good news periods. In Equation (4), the coefficient on NEG*Δ NI is consistent with timely loss recognition, so 3 b should be negative. , generates results similar to those derived from Model (2). When we run separate regressions for the SOE and NSOE subsamples as shown in Models (4) and (5), we obtain results similar to those reported in Table 4 .
Insert Table 5 Here Table 2 shows that the level of management ownership in SOEs is significantly lower than that in NSOEs. To control for the effect of this ownership difference on our findings, we rerun Equation (2) using a matching sample. We start with NSOEs with management ownership and then find matching SOEs with the closest level of management ownership in the same industry and same year. T his process generates a sample of 3,104 observations, half SOEs and half NSOEs. The resultant level of management ownership is not significantly different between the two subsamples. We re-run Model (1) using the matching sample and the results are unchanged.
The foregoing analysis is based on the sample formed by removing observations in the top and bottom 1% for annual income (NI) and return (RET). The results do not change when we winsorizethe observations in the top and bottom 1% for annual income (NI) and return (RET) as an alternative. We have followed L aFond and
Roychowdhury (2008) by using scaled decile ranks for management ownership in the above analysis. Our results are robust to the use of the raw proportion of management ownership.
The investment opportunity set (IOS) is a common factor that affects both management ownership and the accounting conservatism. Himmelberg et al. (1999) model enables us to decompose total management ownership into a predicted component conditional on explanatory variables that primarily proxy for the firm's IOS, and an unexpected component (UNEXP_OWN). Our results are robust to controlling for the IOS.
C onclusion
In this paper we have examined how corporate ownership affects the ethical consequences of management ownership using accounting conservatism as the direct measure of entrenchment and alignment between shareholders and managers. Our results show that in NSOEs, management ownership has an alignment effect. In contrast, it has less of an alignment effect in SOEs than in NSOEs; in actuality, SOEs' management ownership does not produce either an alignment effect or entrenchment effect. These results indicate that the governance role of management ownership is moderated by the nature of ultimate controlling ownership. A n important policy implication of our findings is that management ownership is an effective governance 2 0 mechanism in NSOEs, but not so in SOEs. The main reason is that the differences in ownership nature mean that the two types of firms have different objectives. OWN is the percentage of management ownership to total equity shares. NI is annual income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. RET is market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns from May of year t to A pril of year t1; NEG is an indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; LE V is equal to total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE is equal to natural log of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOEs are defined as those firms directly or indirectly owned or controlled by State-owned A ssets Supervision and A dministration Commission or other state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government or local governments. NSOEs are defined as those firms controlled by private investors. ***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. Table 3  C orrelation matrix   OWN  SOE  NI  RET  NEG  MB  LEV OWN is the percentage of shares held by all directors at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if it is an NSOE. NI is annual income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. RET is market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns from May of year t to April of year t1; NEG is an indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; LEV is equal to total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE is equal to the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. ***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
Intercept ( Notes The dependent variable is NI. NI is annual income before extraordinary items scaled by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. OWN is equal to the scaled decile rank of percentage of shares held by all directors at the beginning of the fiscal year; RET is market-adjusted buy-and-hold annual returns from May of year t to A pril of year t1; NEG is an indicator variable equal to 1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise; SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if it is an NSOE. CONTROLS include: MB, measured by the scaled decile rank of the market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year; LEV, measured by the scaled decile rank of total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; SIZE, measured by the scaled decile rank of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. In parentheses are t-statistics. ***: Significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
2 8 
Intercept ( 
